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Motivated by the troubling rise of political extremism and instability throughout the democratic world, we
present a novel mathematical characterization of the nature of political representation in democratic elections.
We define the concepts of negative representation, in which a shift in electorate opinions produces a shift in
the election outcome in the opposite direction, and electoral instability, in which an arbitrarily small change in
opinion causes a large change in election outcome. Under very general conditions, we prove that unstable elec-
tions necessarily contain negatively represented opinions. Furthermore, increasing polarization of the electorate
can drive elections through a transition from a stable to an unstable regime, analogous to the phase transition by
which some materials become ferromagnetic below their critical temperatures. In this unstable regime, a large
fraction of political opinions are negatively represented. Empirical data suggest that United States presidential
elections underwent such a phase transition in the 1970s and have since become increasingly unstable.
It is generally believed that American democracy represents
its citizens. However, the nature of this representation is un-
clear. Did the American electorate change so much between
2012 and 2016 that it is possible for candidates as different
as Obama and Trump to have both been representative of that
electorate? Indeed, many citizens believe Trump does not rep-
resent America [1], and others thought the same of Obama [2].
A clue to this puzzle of representation is the observation that
a small change in the electorate can result in a large swing
in the election outcome. For instance, in both the 2000 and
2016 presidential elections, a change in the political prefer-
ences of less than one percent of the electorate or the use of
a national popular vote would have shifted the outcome be-
tween two very different candidates. Using a novel mathe-
matical framework for analyzing elections and representation,
we demonstrate how the instability described above implies a
failure of representation.
Elections are, fundamentally, a means of aggregating many
opinions into one—those of the citizens into that of the elected
official. The opinions of the electorate and candidates must
lie in some set of all potential opinions; for simplicity, we
focus on the case in which this set can be embedded in a one-
dimensional continuous space (R), as in other studies [3–6],
and extend the results to a multidimensional space in sec-
tion S2 A. We define an election by y[f(x)], a functional (a
function of a function) that maps the distribution of electorate
opinions f(x)—defined so that for any interval [a, b] ∈ R, the
number of voters with opinions in that interval is
∫ b
a
f(x)dx—
to the election outcome y ∈ R, the opinion of the elected of-
ficial. Note that in this framework, candidacy is endogenous:
candidate opinions—or equivalently, which candidates run—
are themselves functions of the electorate opinions. Any elec-
toral system, regardless of its detailed mechanisms (e.g. the
number of candidates, the nature of political parties, etc.) can
be conceptualized as such a process—a black box that outputs
the opinion of the winning candidate based on the electorate
opinions. The one restriction we place on this process is trans-
lational invariance: we assume that the election outcome will
shift by c if all opinions are shifted by c, or formally
y[f(x+ c)] + c = y[f(x)] (1)
for all c. (This assumption is technically stronger than
necessary—see section S1 B.) If the model were not transla-
tionally invariant, it would a priori privilege certain opinions
over others.
In order for representation to measure how much election
outcomes change in response to changes in voter opinions [7],
we define the representation of an opinion x by
rc(f, x) =
δy
c
(2)
where δy is the change in outcome that would occur if x
changes to x′ = x + c. (Representation should not be de-
fined using only the distance between a voter’s opinion and
that of the elected candidate: opinions without causal influ-
ence on the election outcome are not represented, even if they
happen to align with that outcome.) It is convenient to mea-
sure representation by
r(f, x) = lim
c→0
rc(f, x) (3)
when the limit exists, since r(f, x) does not depend on c.
For a large population, a number of results hold (see sec-
tion S1 C for details). First, we can express representation in
terms of functional derivatives of the election, assuming they
exist:
r(f, x) =
d
dx
δy
δf(x)
(4)
(Note: the functional derivative δyδf(x) measures the change in
the outcome y with respect to a small increase in the distribu-
tion of opinions at x—see section S1 A.) Second, rc(f, x) is
the average of r(f, x) over the interval [x, x+c], and thus rep-
resentation of individual opinions can be measured by r(f, x)
alone. Third, the total representation of the electorate’s opin-
ions equals 1: ∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)r(f, x)dx = 1 (5)
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FIG. 1. Changes in election outcomes (vertical dashed lines) result-
ing from changes in distributions of voter opinions (f(x), denoted by
the blue curves), where the horizontal axes (x) denote political opin-
ion. (A to B) When not everyone votes, an election can be unstable
(eq. (12))—a small shift in voters to the right causes a large swing
in the election outcome. (C to D) For median voting, by contrast, a
small shift in voters causes a similarly small shift in outcome.
Because the total amount of representation is fixed, individ-
ual voter opinions are on average more represented in smaller
democracies than in larger ones. Although (or perhaps be-
cause) this fact is intuitive, its implications are largely ignored
in public discourse.
Before discussing our main results concerning negative rep-
resentation and instability, we apply our formalism to two
examples. The Median Voter Theorem [4] states that when
political opinions lie in one dimension and everyone votes
for the candidate whose opinion is closest to his, the optimal
position for a candidate to take is that of the median voter.
For this type of election, y[f ] = median[f ] ≡ m, yield-
ing r(f, x) = ddx
δy
δf(x) =
d
dx
1
2f(m) sign(x − m) = δ(x−m)f(m) .
Only the median voter’s opinion is represented—other opin-
ions matter in that they establish who the median voter is. This
concentration of representation is consistent with the Owen-
Shapley index [8] of voting power (section S2 B). By con-
trast, for an election in which the mean opinion is selected
(y[f ] =
∫∞
−∞ f(x)xdx∫∞
−∞ f(x)dx
), all opinions are equally represented
(r(f, x) = 1N where N is the number of voters). Despite this
equal representation, mean voting has its problems: the pres-
ence of an extreme opinion can have an outsized effect, and
voters therefore have an incentive to exaggerate their opinions.
Median voting, on the other hand, is robust: the presence of an
additional opinion, regardless of its extremity, has an equal ef-
fect of δyδf(x) = ± 12f(m) . For actual elections, in contrast with
the assumptions of the Median Voter Theorem, not everyone
votes. As we later show, when people with opinions farther
from both candidates are more likely to vote, elections can
lean towards mean voting; when those people are less likely
to vote, negative representation and instability can arise.
Instability and negative representation are comorbid. An
election is unstable if an arbitrarily small change in opinion
can cause a sizable change in the election outcome (fig. 1),
i.e. for some f and x,
lim
c→0
crc(f, x) 6= 0 (6)
If an election y[f ] is unstable for an opinion distribution f0,
then if some opinion x0 changes by a small amount  (call
the resulting opinion distribution f1), the election outcome
changes by a larger amount C, i.e. δy1 ≡ y[f1] − y[f0] = C
with |C| > ||. Now consider starting with f0 and shifting all
opinions except x0 by − (call the resulting opinion distribu-
tion f2). Since f2(x) = f1(x+), δy2 ≡ y[f2]−y[f0] = C−
by translational invariance (eq. (1), see section S1 B). Thus,
δy1 and δy2 have the same sign (since |C| > ||), despite be-
ing caused by changes of opinion in opposite directions, so
one of the two changes in opinions must be negatively rep-
resented. Note that eq. (5), which holds only when the pop-
ulation is large and the election differentiable, was not used,
as this result involves a lack of continuity. (Specifically, the
effects of individual changes in opinion on the election out-
come need not be additive, while eq. (5) assumes that these
effects can be expanded to linear order.) This proof that in-
stability implies negative representation relies only on trans-
lational invariance; therefore, we expect it to hold generally in
real-world conditions, regardless of the size of the electorate,
the number of candidates, the existence of primaries, the ef-
fects of the electoral college, etc.
To illustrate how negative representation can arise and to
show how polarization drives elections through a phase tran-
sition into an unstable regime, we now examine probabilistic
voting models [9–12]. Consider an election with two candi-
dates who choose their positions in order to maximize their
chances of winning the election (or, equivalently, choose to
run/are selected to run in the general election based on these
considerations; see section S1 D). Denoting the probability
that a vote from someone with opinion x will go to the first
candidate minus the probability that it will go to the second
by px(y1, y2) (where y1 and y2 are the opinions of the first
and second candidates, respectively), we assume there exists
some function ux such that
px(y1, y2) = ux(y1)− ux(y2) (7)
This assumption yields an affine linear utility difference
model [11]; possible election outcomes are given by (Theo-
rem 4 of [11]):
argmax
y
∫ ∞
−∞
ux(y)f(x)dx (8)
Essentially, this model assumes that the position that maxi-
mizes a candidate’s margin of victory does not depend on the
position of the other candidate. Although this model may not
be an accurate description of individual behavior and although
it ignores factors such as primaries, it can nonetheless describe
the properties of real-world elections, since representation and
instability depend only on the election outcome as a func-
tion of electorate opinions and not on the mechanism through
3which the outcome arises. For instance, this model cannot
describe the deterministic voting underlying the median voter
theorem but can nonetheless exactly capture the collective be-
havior that such voting gives rise to, namely the election of
the median opinion for ux(y) = −|y − x|. (Mean voting is
captured by ux(y) = −(y−x)2 and a system between median
and mean voting is captured by ux(y) = −
√
(y − x)2 + b2
for varying values of b—see section S1 E.)
Voters with opinions that are very far from both candidates
are more likely to abstain from voting, a phenomenon known
as alienation [13–15]. Since not voting for either candidate is
equivalent to preferring them equally, a utility function ux(y)
that captures alienation will be almost flat for large |y − x|.
One such utility function is
ux(y) = u(y − x) = e−
(y−x)2
2a2 (9)
where a is a positive constant. Representation is then given
by (section S1 F)
r(f, x) ∝ − 1
N
u′′(y∗−x) = 1
Na4
(a2− (y∗−x)2)e− (y
∗−x)2
2a2
(10)
where N is the number of constituents. Opinions far from the
election outcome (|x − y∗| > a) are negatively represented
(r(f, x) < 0, see fig. 2): the election outcome is inversely
sensitive to changes in those opinions. For example, given
a center-left candidate and a candidate to the right, as left-
wing individuals move farther left, they become less likely
to vote for the center-left candidate (often choosing instead
not to vote), which increases the probability that the candi-
date on the right will win. In response, the electoral equilib-
rium of future elections may shift rightward, as candidates no
longer vie for these left-wing votes, or instability may arise,
as future left-leaning candidates chase these votes, widening
the distance between themselves and the right-leaning can-
didates. Mathematically, negative representation is avoided
only when u(y − x) is concave, an assumption that is quite
limiting but nonetheless often used in the social choice liter-
ature to simplify the mathematics (if u is concave, then so is∫∞
−∞ u(y − x)f(x)dx, which guarantees a single local max-
imum y∗ that is also the global maximum). From an indi-
vidual’s perspective, negative representation is a natural out-
come: of course the election outcome will move away from
those who decide not to vote. But on a system level, negative
representation indicates a perversion in the election’s aggre-
gation of constituents’ opinions.
When combined with a polarized electorate, negative rep-
resentation leads to instability (we proved the converse under
more general conditions; see section S1 G for further discus-
sion and mathematical details). For ux defined by eq. (9) and
an opinion distribution f(x) consisting of two (potentially un-
equally weighted) normal distributions centered at ±∆,
f(x) = w1e
− (x+∆)2
2σ2 + w2e
− (x−∆)2
2σ2 , (11)
a-a x - y*
r
FIG. 2. When some voters abstain due to alienation, opinions far
from the election outcome may be negatively represented. This graph
depicts the representation (r) of opinions (x) as a function of their
distance from the election outcome (y∗) for voting behavior given by
eq. (9).
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FIG. 3. (A through C) With increasing polarization (J) of the voter
opinion distribution, (D) the electoral system undergoes a phase tran-
sition from possessing a single stable outcome to possessing two
possible unstable outcomes. (E) In the stable regime, the outcome
smoothly responds to changes in the relative sizes of the two sub-
populations (changes in h). (F) At the phase transition (J = 1),
the outcome is continuous but not differentiable in the relative sizes
of the two subpopulations. (G) In the unstable regime, the outcome
discontinuously jumps. These figures were created using eqs. (11)
and (12) for a = σ = 1 (for which J = ∆2/2).
the outcome y is given by the following condition:
y/∆ = tanh(Jy/∆ + h) (12)
where J = ∆2/(a2+σ2) and h = 12 ln
w2
w1
. For w1 = w2 (i.e.
for equally sized subpopulations), h = 0, and the election is
stable for J ≤ 1 and unstable for J > 1. In the stable regime,
y = 0. In the unstable regime, there are two possible out-
comes described by ±|y∗|, and an arbitrarily small change in
4FIG. 4. The polarization of the Democratic (blue) and Republican
(red) parties between 1944 and 2012, as measured by the fraction of
polarizing words in the party platforms relative to a baseline. Party
platforms are released once every four years. During the 1970s, there
appears to be a divergence, which may correspond to a phase transi-
tion of the electoral dynamics into instability. The prediction of our
model (black, cf. fig. 3D) is superimposed;R2 values are 0.86 for the
Democratic party and 0.89 for the Republican party. See section S1 I
for further details.
h can cause y to swing between its positive and negative val-
ues, leaving one or the other subpopulations with most of its
opinions negatively represented. If one subpopulation is sig-
nificantly larger, the smaller subpopulation will consistently
lose, but if there is a close balance between the two subpopu-
lations, then small variations determine which subpopulation
wins. The variations might include changes in population, nu-
ances in the candidates’ personalities, changes in the rules
(simple majority versus electoral college system, for exam-
ple), voting restrictions, and the effectiveness of turnout op-
erations. From election cycle to election cycle, the outcome
can swing between the two subpopulations, with the major-
ity of the opinions in the losing subpopulation being nega-
tively represented (section S1 G). This instability that arises
in a polarized electorate was qualitatively predicted in 1957
by Downs [5], who claimed that “democracy does not lead to
effective, stable government when the electorate is polarized.”
This voting model (eq. (12)) is precisely equivalent to a
mean-field Ising model of a ferromagnet [16], in which each
spin (magnetic dipole) interacts with every other spin, high-
lighting the hidden dependencies that can arise from a sys-
tem in which voters’ behaviors are superficially independent
(section S1 H). The seemingly independent voters are coupled
through collectively choosing a candidate. Because of these
effective interactions between voters, the system can exhibit
emergent behavior in which there can be discontinuities in the
election outcome despite the continuous behavior of the vot-
ers. Such emergent discontinuities are a common feature of
complex systems [17–20].
Empirically, the opinions of the United States population,
and in particular the opinions of those most likely to vote,
have been polarizing over the past few decades [21]. Thus,
we might expect that over time, election outcomes have un-
dergone a phase transition, and indeed this appears to be the
case (fig. 4). Changes to the electoral process, such as re-
forms in the early 1970s as to how presidential party nomi-
nees are chosen, together with increasing polarization, have
likely driven this phase transition into instability (and there-
fore negative representation). That the policies of legislators
in politically homogeneous districts are more strongly corre-
lated with the preferences of the district’s median voter than
the policies of legislators in heterogeneous districts [22] lends
further empirical support.
Our results imply that electoral outcomes can be polarized
and unstable, a reflection of negative representation. There-
fore, the impact of electoral reforms on this instability should
be considered. For instance, alienation, which occurs when
not everyone votes, can cause this departure from median vot-
ing. Low turnout, therefore, results not only in fewer voices
being heard, but also in negative representation and instability,
which in turn can breed anger, resentment, political dysfunc-
tion, and a loss of faith in democracy itself.
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S1. METHODS
A. Distributions and functional derivatives
In this section, we give a brief introduction to the mathe-
matics behind Dirac delta functions and functional derivatives.
The Dirac delta function δ(x) is not technically a function, but
is rather a generalized function, also known as a distribution.
A distribution may not be well-defined if evaluated at a par-
ticular point (e.g. δ(x) is not defined for x = 0), but is instead
defined through the integral of its product with ordinary func-
tions.1 For instance, the Dirac delta function is defined by
eq. (13): ∫ ∞
−∞
δ(x)g(x)dx ≡ g(0) (13)
for all continuous functions g : R → R. We note that δ(x)
can be approximated by an arbitrarily narrow gaussian, which
has a total area under its curve of 1. (The more narrow the
gaussian, the taller it must be, so that the product of its height
and width remains constant.) Formally, δ(x) ∼ 1√
pi
e−x
2/
for small , in the sense that
lim
→0
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
pi
e−x
2/g(x)dx = g(0) (14)
for continuous g.
For a set of N voters with opinions {x1, x2, ..., xN}, the
distribution of voter opinions is f(x) =
∑N
i=1 δ(x − xi),
which is the only distribution satisfying the property that∫ b
a
f(x)dx is the number of voters with opinions in the in-
terval [a, b]. However, it is often useful to choose f(x) to
be a smooth function that approximates
∑N
i=1 δ(x − xi), in
the sense that the difference between
∫ b
a
f(x)dx and the num-
ber of voters with opinions in the interval [a, b] is no greater
than 1 for all a, b. One way to achieve this smoothing is to
replace the delta functions by their gaussian approximations
(see fig. S1). For large enough N , the error of up to 1 voter
opinion will generally not be significant. Whether or not f(x)
is chosen to be smooth does not matter for the results of the
text, although for the results that rely on the assumption that
the number of voters is large, the mathematics are simpler if
f(x) is assumed to be a function rather than a distribution.
For instance, the expression for representation in the case of
median voting involves evaluating f at its median, an oper-
ation which is not well-defined if f is a sum of Dirac delta
functions.
1 Technically, a distribution is a map from the set of smooth functions with
compact support to R.
6FIG. S1. By replacing the Dirac delta functions with the approxi-
mation δ(x) ∼ 1√
2pi
e−x
2/2, a smooth distribution is obtained from
the sum of delta functions. Note that the integrals of these distribu-
tions (taken from the lower bound of the domain of the graphs to x)
are very similar, despite the striking differences between the distri-
butions themselves.
A functional F is a map from a space of functions or dis-
tributions to R. In analogy to an ordinary derivative, we can
define the functional derivative δFδf(x) as a function of x that
satisfies the following equation for all δf :
lim
→0
F [f + δf ]− F [f ]

=
∫ ∞
−∞
δF
δf(x)
δf(x)dx (15)
Just as the ordinary derivative of a function g(x) will in gen-
eral depend on x, the functional δFδf(x) will in general depend
on f . The expression δFδf(x) refers to the value obtained when
the functional derivative of F is evaluated at x, just as dg(x)dx
refers to the value obtained when the derivative of g is evalu-
ated at x. By substituting δf(x) = δ(x − x0) into eq. (15),
a simpler formulation for the functional derivative can be ob-
tained:
δF
δf(x0)
≡ lim
→0
F [f(x) + δ(x− x0)]− F [f(x)]

(16)
Thus, we can express a functional derivative in terms of or-
dinary derivatives: if, for a particular f(x) and x0, we define
g() ≡ F [f(x) + δ(x − x0)], then δFδf(x0) = g′(0). This
function g() is shown in fig. S2.
B. Translational invariance
In the main text, we make the assumption of translational
invariance (eq. (1)). Technically, translational invariance is
defined only in relation to a particular metric. Thus, the as-
sumption of translational invariance can be relaxed without
invalidating the paper’s results. For the proof that negative
representation implies instability, all that is required is that
the election be continuous (rather than invariant) under trans-
FIG. S2. These graphs depict the output of the functional F as its
input distribution changes due to a small increase in opinion at x0 =
1. Here, F [·] = mean[·] and f(x) is a normal distribution centered
at −0.1. The delta function is smoothed using δ(x) ∼ 3√
pi
e−9x
2
lations or, mathematically, that for fc(x) = f(x+ c), y[fc] be
continuous in c (note that this property is independent of the
metric). The proof given in the manuscript then follows in the
limit  → 0. For the proof that the total representation sums
to 1 (eq. (5)), there need only exist some metric on the opin-
ion space under which the election is translationally invariant.
The total representation will then equal 1 assuming the elec-
tion is translationally invariant under the metric used to define
representation.
C. Representation in the large-population limit
In this section, we derive properties of our representation
measure when the number of voters N is large. In the limit
of a large population (N >> 1), the change δf in the opinion
distribution arising from an individual opinion will be small
compared to the opinion distribution as a whole, and so we
expand δy to first order in δf :
δy =
∫ ∞
−∞
δf(z)
δy
δf(z)
dz (17)
Note that eq. (17) does not apply to cases in which y[f ] is
not differentiable, e.g. when the election is unstable and small
changes in the opinion distribution can have an outsized im-
pact; thus we do not use results derived from these equations
when analyzing instability.
We now derive eq. (4). Note that when an individual opin-
ion changes from x to x′ = x + c, the opinion distribution
changes by
δf(z) = δ(z − x− c)− δ(z − x) (18)
where δ(z) is the Dirac delta function. Representation
(eq. (2)) is then obtained in terms of functional derivatives
7of the election by substituting eq. (18) into eq. (17):
rc(f, x) =
1
c
δy =
1
c
(
δy
δf(x+ c)
− δy
δf(x)
) (19)
which, combined with eq. (3), yields eq. (4) (reproduced be-
low).
r(f, x) =
d
dx
δy
δf(x)
(20)
By the fundamental theorem of calculus, we see from eq. (19)
that rc(f, x) is the average of r(f, x) over [x, x+ c].
We now prove eq. (5) (
∫∞
−∞ f(x)r(f, x)dx = 1). For small
, f(x + ) = f(x) +  ddxf(x), and thus y[f(x + )] =
y[f(x) +  ddxf(x)] = y[f(x)] + 
∫∞
−∞
df(x)
dx
δy
δf(x)dx. Since f
has compact support, which follows from f being an approxi-
mation of the opinions of a finite number of voters, integrating
by parts yields y[f(x+)] = y[f(x)]− ∫∞−∞ f(x)r(f, x)dx,
which, combined with eq. (1), yields eq. (5). This proof as-
sumes that f is differentiable for illustrative purposes, but
the result will generally hold whenever
∫∞
−∞ f(x)r(f, x)dx
is well-defined, if f is treated as a distribution (generalized
function).
D. Nash equilibria of the electoral game
Consider a two-candidate election with endogenous candi-
dacy: candidate positions (or, equivalently, candidates) are
chosen in order to maximize the probability of victory. In
this framework, the winner of the election will have adopted
an unbeatable position y∗, provided such a position exists (i.e.
a candidate with position y∗ will have at least a 50% chance
of winning against a candidate with any other position). For-
mally, (y∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium, since no candidate can
improve her chances by changing her position. Because the
voting game is symmetric, if (y1, y2) is a Nash equilibrium,
then so are (y1, y1) and (y2, y2); see, for instance, section 2.3
of [9]. Thus, if there is a unique Nash equilibrium, it must be
of the form (y∗, y∗).
E. Utility difference model examples
Here, we give examples of the utility difference model
given by eq. (8) describing median voting, mean voting, and
an election between median and mean voting. For ux(y) =
−a2(y − x)2 where a is a constant, the mean opinion is se-
lected, since for a random variable X , E[(X − µ)2] is mini-
mized for µ = E[X]. (Note that y and the support of f must
be confined to an interval of length at most a−1 so that no
probabilities are greater than 1.) For ux(y) = −a|y − x|
(where again, y and the support of f must be confined to
an interval of length at most a−1), the median opinion is se-
lected (since the median minimizes E[|X − m|]), although
by a different mechanism than the deterministic voting as-
sumptions of the Median Voter Theorem. Both of these
functions can be viewed as limiting cases of the hyperbolic
ux(y) = −
√
a2(y − x)2 + b2, with b << a approximating
median voting and b >> a approximating mean voting. Un-
der mean voting, for a voter either to the right of both can-
didates or to the left of both candidates, the farther away this
voter is, the stronger the voter’s preference between the two
candidates. Under median voting, the strength of this voter’s
preference for one candidate over the other is independent of
how far the voter is from both candidates. For the intermedi-
ate case, the strength of this voter’s preference gets stronger
up to a point and then levels off as the voter moves farther
away from both candidates. However, in actual elections, vot-
ers with opinions that are very far from both candidates are
more likely to abstain from voting (or vote for a third-party
candidate), which is why eq. (9) may be more realistic.
F. Representation in the utility difference model
In this section, we calculate representation for the utility
difference model given by eq. (8). We derive the first part of
eq. (10), and we then calculate representation for the examples
given in section S1 E. To do so, we must assume there is a
single possible election outcome y∗ (see section S1 D). Then,
from eq. (8),
y∗ = argmax
y˜
∫ ∞
−∞
ux(y˜)f(x)dx (21)
which implies
0 =
∫ ∞
−∞
u′x(y
∗)f(x)dx (22)
Note that eq. (21) satisfies y[f(x)] = y[λf(x)] for any pos-
itive constant λ (scale invariance), and let f˜(x) = f(x)/N
whereN is the size of the electorate, so that
∫∞
−∞ f˜(x)dx = 1.
Considering the change that arises from the addition of a sin-
gle individual with opinion x0 to the population, we define
δy∗ by
y∗+δy∗ = y[f(x)+δ(x−x0)] = y[f˜(x)+δ(x−x0)] (23)
where  = 1/N . Then, from eqs. (22) and (23),
0 =
∫ ∞
−∞
u′x(y
∗ + δy∗)(f˜(x) + δ(x− x0))dx (24)
Because
∫∞
−∞ ux(x)f(x)dx is differentiable in f and has a
single maximum in y,
δy∗ = 
−u′x0(y∗)∫∞
−∞ u
′′
x(y
∗)f˜(x)dx
+O(2) (25)
Noting that the denominator is independent of x0, of order 1
(i.e. independent of N ), and negative (otherwise, y∗ would be
8a minimum rather than a maximum),
δy
δf˜(x0)
= lim
→0
δy∗

∝ u′x(y∗) (26)
So, using eq. (4),
r(f, x) =
d
dx
δy
δf(x)
=
1
N
δy
δf˜(x)
∝ 1
N
d
dx
u′x(y
∗) (27)
If ux(y) = u(y − x), as it must be for some function u if the
election is translationally invariant as in eq. (1), then
r(f, x) ∝ − 1
N
u′′(y∗ − x) (28)
Eq. 28 provides a direct link between voter preferences
and the representation of opinions. (If needed, the constant
of proportionality can be determined through eq. (5).) For
u(y − x) = −(y − x)2 and u(y − x) = −|y − x|, we can
quickly derive the results for median and mean voting, respec-
tively. For u(y − x) = b−√(y − x)2 + b2, which yields an
outcome between that of median and mean voting,
r(f, x) ∝ ((x− y[f ]
b
)2 + 1)−3/2 (29)
resulting in the representation of opinions being concentrated
around the election outcome, but not infinitely concentrated
as it is for median voting. For u that are not concave, there
will exist some x such that u′′(x− y) > 0, and representation
will be negative for those opinions (see eq. (28)).
G. Instability in the utility difference model
Here, we explore the conditions under which instability
can arise in the model described by eq. (8), and we elaborate
on the concrete model of instability with outcomes given by
eq. (12). For the model given by eq. (8), r(f, x) = ddx
δy
δf(x) is
shown to be well-defined as long as y[f ] is single-valued, i.e.
eq. (8) has a single maximum (section S1 F). Thus, instability
can occur only when there are multiple maxima.2 For an opin-
ion distribution in which eq. (8) has two maxima y∗1 and y
∗
2 , if
each position is taken by one candidate, then each candidate
2 For a single maximum y∗ with
∫∞
−∞ u
′′(x − y∗)f(x)dx = 0, the func-
tional derivative of y is not defined, but, as can be shown in a higher order
analysis, there is no instability. In particular, for δy∗ defined by eq. (23),
we can derive
1
6
(δy∗)3 =
−u′x0 (y∗)∫∞
−∞ f˜(x)u
′′′′
x (y
∗)dx
+O(4/3)
in place of eq. (25), which yields δy∗ ∝ 1/3u′x0 (y∗)1/3 + O(2/3).
Note that
r(f, x0) =
d
dx
∣∣∣
x=x0
δy∗
is well-defined for any given  = 1/N—although it is not given by eq. (4)
since δy
δf(x)
does not exist—thus, there is no instability.
has a 50% chance of winning the election. However, an arbi-
trarily small change in the opinion distribution can favor one
outcome over the other, giving either y∗1 or y
∗
2 a chance of win-
ning that is arbitrarily close to 100% in the large-population
limit.3
The existence of multiple maxima in y implies that∫∞
−∞ u(x − y)f(x)dx is not concave (ignoring the degener-
ate case in which
∫∞
−∞ u(x− y)f(x)dx is constant over some
interval). Thus, instability can arise only in the case of non-
concave u, which is precisely the same condition under which
negative representation occurs. That instability can arise only
in the presence of negative representation should not surprise
us, since it was proven under more general conditions in the
main text. For this class of models, we also find that negative
representation implies that there exist distributions of opinions
for which instability arises, i.e. if u is not concave, then there
exists an f(x) such that eq. (8) has multiple maxima. To see
why this is true, consider an opinion distribution f such that
f(x) = f(−x). Then, if there is a single maximum of eq. (8),
it must lie at y∗ = 0. In order for y∗ = 0 to be a maximum,
we must have
∫∞
−∞ f(x)u
′′(x)dx = 2
∫∞
0
f(x)u′′(x)dx ≤ 0
(where the equality follows from the symmetry of u and
f ). But since u is twice continuously differentiable and not
concave, there exists an f such that f(x) = f(−x) and∫∞
0
f(x)u′′(x)dx > 0. For such an f , y∗ = 0 is not a
maximum, thus contradicting our assumption that there was
a unique maximum.
To provide an example of how, for non-concave u, the
election is unstable for certain opinion distributions, we con-
sider the u used for the example of negative representation:
u(y − x) = exp
[
− (y−x)22a2
]
for some positive constant a
(eq. (9)). We take the distribution of voter opinions to be a
sum of two (potentially unequally weighted) normal distribu-
tions of equal variance:
f(x) =
∑
α=1,2
wαe
− (x−µα)2
2σ2 (30)
Then, from eq. (8), the outcome of the election is then given
by
argmax
y
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)e−
(y−x)2
2a2 dx = argmax
y
∑
α=1,2
wαe
− (y−µα)2
2(a2+σ2)
(31)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that µ2 = −µ1 ≡
∆ ≥ 0. Defining the normalized election outcome yˆ ≡ y/∆,
we solve eq. (31) to get the following condition:
yˆ = tanh(Jyˆ + h) (32)
where J = ∆2/(a2+σ2) and h = 12 ln
w2
w1
. For w1 = w2 (i.e.
3 For a finite population, the outcome of the election in this model is not de-
terministic, and the probability of a given candidate winning is continuous
with respect to the opinion distribution. This discontinuity in y[f] arising
from multiple Nash equilibria in the large-population limit is analogous to
a first-order phase transition.
9for equally sized subpopulations), h = 0, and the election is
stable with yˆ = 0 for J ≤ 1 and unstable for J > 1. In the
unstable regime, there are two possible outcomes described
by ±|yˆ∗|, and an arbitrarily small change in h can cause yˆ to
swing between its positive and negative value. In this regime,
the majority of one of the subpopulations will be negatively
represented: for y∗ < 0, over half of the subpopulation cen-
tered at ∆ will have opinions x with x − y∗ > ∆ − y∗ > a
(∆ > a in the unstable regime), and, from eq. (10), represen-
tation is negative for these opinions. Likewise, for y∗ > 0 in
the unstable regime, over half of the subpopulation centered
at −∆ will be negatively represented.
H. Connection with the mean-field Ising model
We map the voting model that gives rise to eq. (12) (de-
scribed in detail in section S1 G) onto a mean-field Ising
model [16]. To begin constructing this map, note that the left-
hand side of eq. (31) gives the limiting value of y as N →∞
when y is drawn from a probability distribution corresponding
to the partition function4
Z =
∫ ∞
−∞
[∫ ∞
−∞
e−
(y−x)2
2a2 f(x)dx
]N
dy (33)
For large N , having N voters with deterministic opinions xi
distributed according to f(x) is equivalent to having N vot-
ers with probabilistic i.i.d. opinions with PDF f(x). We can
therefore view the partition function as describing the voting
population, with each voter interacting with the election out-
come y.
Because y is a gaussian random variable, we integrate over
y, which yields, up to a multiplicative constant,
Z =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
∑
i
(xi−x¯)2
2a2 ΠNi=1(f(xi)dxi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
1
2N
∑
i,j
(xi−xj)2
2a2 ΠNi=1(f(xi)dxi) (34)
This equation describes N interacting probabilistic “spins,”
with each spin weighted by the opinion distribution f(x), with
an energy penalty proportional to its mean-square distance
from all of the other spins. For f(x) given by eq. (11), the
behavior is exactly that of a mean-field Ising model (with an
external magnetic field for w1 6= w2); in general, for bimodal
symmetric f(x) we expect a phase transition in which the
system will spontaneously break the symmetry between the
peaks as the peaks move farther apart. In the stable/disordered
phase, both of the peaks of f(x) are sampled by the “spins;”
in the unstable/ordered phase, however, only one of the two
peaks is sampled, and therefore the other peak is not repre-
sented. Despite the fact that each individual votes indepen-
dently from everyone else, voters are coupled through their
collectively choosing a candidate, which, as shown above, is
equivalent to each voter being coupled to every other voter.
In the limit of weak interactions, i.e. a → ∞, we recover
mean voting, since in this limit, u(y−x) = exp
[
− (y−x)22a2
]
≈
1 − 12a2 (y − x)2. (Quadratic utility functions yield mean
voting—see section S1 E.) Thus, mean voting is a way of “in-
dependently” aggregating opinions.
For a general u(y − xi) = exp[−V (y − xi)] (since 0 ≤
u(x−y) ≤ 1, we can always write u in this form with V (x) ≥
0), we note that eq. (8) yields an election outcome equivalent
to the limit of y as N →∞ with y drawn from
Z =
∫ ∞
−∞
[∫ ∞
−∞
e−V (y−x)f(x)dx
]N
dy =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
∑
i V (y−xi)ΠNi=1(f(xi)dxi) (35)
4 If the states of a physical system described by the variables m1, ...,mN
have a ratio of energy to temperature of f(m1, ...,mN ), the probabil-
ity density of the system being in any one configuration is given by
1
Z
e−f(m1,...,mN ) where the normalization Z is known as the partition
function and is given by
Z =
∫
e−f(m1,...,mN )dm1dm2 ...dmN =
∫
e−f(m1,...,mN )ΠNi=1(dmi)
For quadratic V , we saw above that we could exactly integrate
over the election outcome y to yield pairwise quadratic inter-
actions between the xi variables, but for general V , such an
integration will yield many interaction terms of higher than
quadratic order between these xi. Although such integration
where each mi is integrated over its entire domain.
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cannot be carried out precisely, we expect this interacting sys-
tem to undergo a phase transition for bimodal f(x) if the ex-
pansion of V produces sufficiently strong interactions. Thus,
the system’s behavior should be similar to the exactly solvable
case in which V is quadratic.
I. Empirical data
To determine if the stability of U.S. presidential elections
has changed over time, we used data from Jordan et al. [23]
on the polarization in the party platforms. Jordan et al. used a
combination of machine learning and human judgment to de-
termine which of the frequently used words in the party plat-
forms were polarizing and then determined the number of po-
larizing words (classified by political issue dimensions such
as economic, foreign, etc.) in the Republican and Democratic
platforms from 1944 to 2012. From this data, we calculated
the total number of polarizing words as a percentage of all
words in the platforms. We chose the percentage of polariz-
ing words in the party platforms as a measure of political po-
larization over other measures of ideology—such as NOMI-
NATE scores [24], which measure ideological purity based on
agreement with other politicians—because we wanted an ex-
ternal, content-based measure of divergence in opinion rather
than a measure of ideology that depends only on the posi-
tions that politicians take relative to one another. To construct
fig. 4, we plotted by year the fraction of polarizing words in
the Democratic platforms and the negative of the fraction of
polarizing words in the Republican platforms. To correct for
any time-independent bias affecting the number of polarizing
words in the party platforms—for instance, which words Jor-
dan et al. designated as polarizing—we subtracted from the
data for each party separately the fraction of polarizing words
from the year of least polarization for that party (which was
1948 for both parties). Thus, the data shown are the changes in
the fraction of polarizing words relative to their baseline value
(0.0258 for Democratic platforms and 0.0693 for Republican
platforms).
As was noted in the manuscript and explained in sec-
tion S1 H, our voting model (fig. 3) is equivalent to a mean-
field Ising model. Real-world elections are unlikely to follow
this model exactly, and even if they did, there is no reason
to believe that there would be a simple relationship between
polarization (for which J is a dimensionless measure) and
time. Nonetheless, if U.S. presidential elections underwent
a phase transition in the same universality class as the mean-
field Ising model, then in the vicinity of the phase transition,
polarization would increase in proportion to the square root
of the time from the transition, regardless of the precise re-
lationship between time and polarization. In much the same
way, magnetization increases near a ferromagnetic phase tran-
sition in proportion to (T − Tc)β , where T is temperature, Tc
is the temperature at which the phase transition occurs, and β
is known as a critical exponent, which depends only on the
universality class to which the phase transition belongs [25].
Inspired by this universality, we fit the polarization of both
parties to the piecewise function
f(x) =
{
0 x ≤ x0
A
√
x− x0 x > x0 (36)
where x is the year and f(x) is the fraction of polarizing
words in that year’s platform relative to the baseline value (see
above), and A and x0 are free parameters, corresponding to
the amplitude of the polarization and the year that it begins, re-
spectively. We found that x0 = 1970.54 and A = 0.0079196
minimize the total sum of square errors, yielding R2 values
of 0.86 for the Democratic party and 0.89 for the Republican
party. If the two parties are considered together, R2 = 0.87.
S2. SUPPLEMENTARY TEXT
A. Multidimensional opinion space
For the sake of simplicity, this paper focuses on systems
with a one-dimensional opinion space, but the concepts de-
veloped in this paper can naturally be extended to a multidi-
mensional opinion space, where the opinions of the electorate
and candidates lie in Rn, as in [9–11, 26]. This extension will
be briefly outlined here. The definition of representation is
generalized by replacing eq. (2) with
r~c,µν(f, x) =
δyµcν
|c|2 (37)
For a scalar measure, we use
tr[r~c] =
~c · δ~y
|c|2 (38)
When there exists an rµν(f, x) such that
δyµ =
∑
ν
rµν(f, x)cν +O(c
2) (39)
for all ~c, this rµν(f, x) can be used in place of eq. (3) as a
representation independent of ~c. In the large-population limit,
eq. (19) is then replaced (using Einstein-summation notation)
by the path-independent integral
tr[r~c(f, x)] =
cµ
|c|2
(
δyµ
δf(~x+ ~c)
− δyµ
δf(~x)
)
=
cµ
|c|2
∫ ~x+~c
~x
rµν(f, x
′)dx′ν (40)
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where r(f, x) (which satisfies eq. (39)) is a matrix defined by
rµν(f, x) =
∂
∂xν
δyµ
δf(x)
(41)
The differential representation in a direction given by the unit
vector vˆ is then given by vˆµrµν(f, x)vˆν , which yields the
same results as eq. 7 of [7] in the limit of a continuum of vot-
ers. The trace tr[r] gives a rotationally invariant scalar mea-
sure.
The representation normalization condition corresponding
to eq. (5) is
∫
f(x)rµν(f, x)dx = δµν where the integral is
taken over Rn.
In the multidimensional case, instability also implies a fail-
ure in representation. Analagously to eq. (6), instability is
characterized by
lim
~c→0
cνr~c,µν 6= 0 (42)
Generally, instability implies either that lim~c→0 |c| tr[r~c] 6= 0,
in which case negative representation (defined by tr[r~c] < 0)
follows in the same way as the one-dimensional case, or that
an infinitesimal change in opinion causes a finite orthogonal
change in the outcome of the election. In this case, by consid-
ering further infinitesimal changes in opinion parallel to the
first change in election outcome, and assuming that the magni-
tude of the change in the outcome of the election cannot grow
without bound, one either gets negative representation directly
(tr[r~c] < 0 for some ~c)—or tr[r~c] > 1, from which negative
representation follows as it does in the one-dimensional case.
B. The Owen-Shapley index as a special case
In this section we show that there exist functionals y[f(x)]
for which our representation measure (eq. (4)) reproduces
the values of both the deterministic and probabilistic Owen-
Shapley voting power indices. Thus, these voting power in-
dices can be thought of as special cases of our measure. We
give a brief background on the voting power literature and
then consider the case of a one-dimensional opinion space,
followed by a generalization to the case of a multidimensional
opinion space for which the Owen-Shapley index was primar-
ily designed.
When nothing is known about the preferences of voters,
their political power has traditionally been measured by a
priori voting power [27], which reflects the probability that
a given individual or entity will cast the deciding vote and
is usually measured by either the Penrose index [28] or the
Shapley-Shubik index [29]. More precisely, to calculate a
voter’s a priori voting power, consider a random division of
the rest of the voters into two camps. Then the probability
that the excluded voter will get his way regardless of which
camp he joins is his voting power; the Penrose index and the
Shapley-Shubik index differ only in the way in which they
randomly choose a division. While the Penrose index as-
sumes that each voter randomly chooses one side or the other,
the Shapley-Shubik index re-weights the probabilities so that
each ordering of voters is equally likely.5 These indices pro-
vide useful and counterintuitive results when the voters pos-
sess differing numbers of votes, as in the European Union. For
instance, under the 1958 voting rules for the European Eco-
nomic Community, Luxembourg, despite having had one vote,
had no voting power, since there were no possible divisions of
the other five countries such that Luxembourg’s vote would
be decisive [30]. But in elections in which each voter has one
vote, all measures of a priori voting power result in each voter
having an equal amount of power. A measure of voting power
that takes voter preferences into account is needed to deter-
mine how various opinions are differently represented. Many
preference-based measures have been proposed—for instance,
the spatial Shapley-Shubik index, also known as the Owen-
Shapley index [8]—but, as we will see, these measures im-
plicitly assume that people vote in a particular way.
In one dimension, the deterministic Owen-Shapley in-
dex [8] allows for only two possible orderings of the voters
(left to right or right to left), for which the median voter is
pivotal in both, thus yielding the same concentration of power
that our representation measure (eq. (3)) yields in the case of
median voting. Benati and Marzetti [31] note that this extreme
concentration of power is due to the deterministic nature of the
Owen-Shapley model, which assigns zero probability to al-
most all orderings. They propose a generalized election model
in which voters’ opinions have both a deterministic and a ran-
dom component. In the one-dimensional case, their treatment
is equivalent to denoting the probabilistic opinion Xi of voter
i by
Xi = xi + i (43)
where the xi are deterministic and the i are independent ran-
dom variables with a continuous probability density function
f(i). Denoting the distribution of the xi over the population
by f(xi) (note that f will be a sum of delta functions for a
finite population) and choosing an election in which people
vote for the candidate closest to their probabilistic opinions
Xi,6 the Nash equilibrium for the two candidates’ opinions
is the median of the distribution fX(X) ≡ (f ∗ f)(x) =∫∞
−∞ f(x)f(X − x)dx, i.e.
y[f ] = median[fX ] = median[f ∗ f] ≡ m (44)
The continuity of fX follows from that of f, and we have
made the additional assumption that fX(m) 6= 0; otherwise,
there is no unique Nash equilibrium.
We then calculate
5 There are some fundamental differences in the motivation behind the
indices[27], but mathematically, they are rather similar, though neither is
without drawbacks: while the assumptions behind the Penrose index are
simpler, in general the sum of all voters’ Penrose indices will not equal 1,
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δy[f ]
δf(x)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
δmedian[fX ]
δfX(z)
δfX(z)
δf(x)
dz =
∫ ∞
−∞
sign(z −m)
2fX(m)
f(z − x)dz =
∫ ∞
−∞
sign(z + x−m)
2fX(m)
f(z)dz (45)
which yields the representation measure (eq. (4)) for opinion i:
r(f, xi) =
d
dxi
δy[f ]
δf(xi)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
2δ(z + xi −m)
2fX(m)
f(z)dz =
1
fX(m)
f(m− xi) (46)
The rightmost side of eq. (46) is the probability that voter i is
the median—i.e. pivotal—voter; thus, r(f, xi) is equal to the
generalized Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) for voter i.
The Owen-Shapley index was developed primarily for mul-
tidimensional opinion spaces in Rn. Owen and Shapley [8]
consider a randomly drawn unit vector vˆ ∈ Rn and then or-
der individuals by defining i < j if ~Xi · vˆ < ~Xj · vˆ. (The
~Xi are deterministic but can easily be modified to be partially
probabilistic as in [31].) The SSI of i is again the probability
that i is the median of the resulting ordering. To see how this
power index is a special case of our multidimensional repre-
sentation measure (eq. (41)), consider the following method
of choosing a candidate, given a set of voters with (potentially
probabilistic) opinions Xi ∈ Rn:
1) Randomly choose an orthonormal basis {vˆ1, ..., vˆn} for
Rn.
2) Let mα be the median of the probability distribution
function for vˆα · ~X , where ~X is randomly drawn from the
voter opinions Xi.
3) The election outcome is then given by ~y[f ] =∑n
α=1mαvˆα.
Note that ~y is now a random variable, and so the right-hand
side of eq. (41) must be replaced by its expectation value, i.e.
rµν(f, ~x) = E[ ∂∂xν
δyµ
δf(~x) ]. From eq. (46) (with vˆ ·~y, vˆ · ~xi, and
vˆ · ~i substituting for y, xi, and i), vˆµrµν(f, ~xi)vˆν is equal to
the probability that i will be the median voter along vˆ. There-
fore, tr[r(f, ~xi)] is equal to the expected number of basis vec-
tors along which i will be the median, and so tr[r(f, ~xi)] is
equivalent to n times the SSI.7
The agreement between r(f, x) and the SSI follows from
the fact that dd(vˆ·~xi)
δmedian[fvˆ· ~X ]
δf(~xi)
measures the probability that
i is the median voter along vˆ for this class of voting mod-
els. In this sense, the Owen-Shapley index of power implic-
itly assumes an election in which some sort of median is cho-
sen. This model is appropriate when voters vote deterministi-
cally (although the options presented for them to vote on may
be random). But such deterministic voting assumes that vot-
ers distinguish between very small differences in policy with
100% certainty, and it also assumes that there is no chance
that a voter abstains. While these assumptions may hold for
assemblies of elected officials (and in particular to the EU,
where these measures are most commonly applied), they tend
to fail for mass elections, in which a voter may sometimes
vote for the candidate farther from her opinion and sometimes
may choose not to vote at all.
while the sum of all voters’ Shapley-Shubik indices will.
6 This election takes the form of the Random Utility Model mentioned in
section 2.2 of [11].
7 Note that had we treated the election as deterministic by defining the out-
come y′ by y′ = E[y] and then defined representation by ∂
∂xν
δy′µ
δf(~x)
=
∂
∂xν
δE[yµ]
δf(~x)
, we would have arrived at a different answer, since the proba-
bility distribution over which the expected value is taken depends on f(x).
